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1Inference of Signs of Interaction Eects
in Simultaneous Games with Incomplete Information
Abstract
This paper studies the inference of interaction eects, i.e., the impacts of players' actions
on each other's payos, in discrete simultaneous games with incomplete information. We
propose an easily implementable test for the signs of state-dependent interaction eects
that does not require parametric specications of players' payos, the distributions of their
private signals or the equilibrium selection mechanism. The test relies on the commonly
invoked assumption that players' private signals are independent conditional on observed
states. The procedure is valid in the presence of multiple equilibria, and, as a by-product of
our approach, we propose a formal test for multiple equilibria in the data-generating process.
We provide Monte Carlo evidence of the test's good performance in nite samples. We also
implement the test to infer the direction of interaction eects in couples' joint retirement
decisions using data from the Health and Retirement Study.
JEL Codes: C01, C72
21 Introduction
Strategic interaction eects occur when a player's action choice aects not only his or her
own payo but also those of other players. In simultaneous discrete games of incomplete
information, each person has a private signal about his or her payo, while the joint distri-
bution of such private signals is common knowledge among all players. In a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (BNE), individuals act to maximize their expected payos given their knowledge
of these distributions as well as the payo structure. Such models have found applications
in a wide array of empirical contexts where players are uncertain about their competitors'
payos given their own information. These include airing commercials at radio stations
(Sweeting (2009)) and peer eects in recommendations by nancial analysts (Bajari, Hong,
Krainer, and Nekipelov (forthcoming)).
Earlier works have studied the identication and estimation of these games using a
wide spectrum of restrictions. These include (but are not limited to) the independence of
private information variables from observable covariates, parametric specication of relevant
distributions or utility functions, or constraints on the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria.1 In
comparison, in this paper we focus on inference of the signs of interaction eects, which are
allowed to be individual-specic and state-dependent, under a minimal set of nonparametric
restrictions on private signals and payo structures. Our choice of focus is motivated by two
considerations. First, signs of interaction eects alone have important policy implications.
For example, consider the context of couples' joint retirement decisions as studied by Banks,
Blundell, and Casanova Rivas (2007) and Casanova Rivas (2009). If spouses enjoy retirement
more when their partner is retired as well (i.e., interaction eects are positive), then any ex-
1Wan and Xu (2010), for example, consider the set of monotone, threshold-crossing Bayesian Nash equi-
libria. Recent work by Grieco (2010) studies a class of games with exible information structures that also
subsume games with complete information where players know each other's payos for sure. In a similar
spirit, Navarro and Takahashi (2009) suggest a test for the information structure that, among other things,
relies on a degenerate equilibrium selection rule and independence of residuals and observed covariates.
3ogenous change in retirement provisions that force the wife to delay her retirement should
at the same time also dampen the husband's incentive to retire. Second, while point iden-
tication and estimation of the full structure of such games inevitably hinge on stochastic
restrictions on private signal distributions (such as perfect knowledge or independence) and
parametric specications of payos (such as index specication), inference on signs of inter-
action eects can be done under minimal nonparametric restrictions on the structure. Such
inference is valid even in the presence of multiple equilibria and does not invoke any assump-
tions on the equilibrium selection mechanism in the data-generating process. This feature
of our procedure is particularly notable, since almost all previous work has relied on strin-
gent assumptions about equilibrium selection or multiplicity to attain identication (e.g.,
the single-equilibrium assumption in Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (forthcoming)
and Tang (2009), equilibrium uniqueness in Seim (2006) or Aradillas-Lopez (forthcoming),
or the parametric specication of equilibrium selection mechanism as in Sweeting (2009) or
other work).2
We rst show how the existence of multiple equilibria in the data can be exploited
to infer the signs of strategic interactions. If private signals are independent from each
other conditional on observed covariates, the joint probability of a prole of actions must
be the product of marginal probabilities for individual actions in any single equilibrium.
When multiple equilibria exist in the data, the choice probabilities observed are mixtures
of those implied in each single equilibrium. We show in Section 3 that signs of correlations
between players' actions are determined by signs of the strategic interaction eects. As a
byproduct, the correlations also allow us to identify the existence of multiple equilibria in
the data (see below). The assumption of conditional independence of private information is
commonly maintained in the literature on estimation and inference in statistic games with
2As indicated in Berry and Tamer (2007), another possibility is to resort to partial identication. Ex-
amples of such a strategy under complete information are Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2009),
Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), Galichon and Henry (2009) and earlier references cited in Berry and Tamer
(2007).
4incomplete information (see, for example, Seim (2006), Aradillas-Lopez (forthcoming), Berry
and Tamer (2007), Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (forthcoming), Bajari, Hahn, Hong,
and Ridder (forthcoming), Brock and Durlauf (2007), Sweeting (2009) and Tang (2009)).3
The assumption can also be found in the literature on the estimation of dynamic games with
incomplete information.
We then generalize these arguments for identifying the signs of interaction eects so
as to allow for the possibility that there is only a unique equilibrium for a given state in the
data. This is done by exploiting an exclusion restriction on the states. The idea relies on
the following simple intuition. Suppose that for some player i, there exists a subvector of
state variables that aect other players' payos or private signals but not his or her own.
Then the correlation between actions chosen by i and others across dierent realizations
of such \excluded" states must be solely determined by the direction of others' interaction
eects on i's payos, provided private signals are independent given observed states. Such
exclusion restrictions on state variables arise naturally in many applications. For example,
in a static entry-and-exit game between two rms, it might be plausible to assume that some
idiosyncratic factors aecting Firm A's costs (such as geographic location) may not enter
Firm B's prots or private information directly.
Another contribution of this paper is to introduce formal tests for the presence of
multiple equilibria in the data-generating process. Such tests arise as a natural by-product
of the logic underlying our inference of the signs of interaction eects. Note that the test
for multiple equilibria is of practical importance in structural empirical research. When the
equilibrium conditional choice probabilities are the same for all players in a game, the average
3A recent exception is Wan and Xu (2010), who nevertheless rely on further restrictions on the solution
concept and the environment to obtain identication. To handle the correlation in private types, they rely on
monotone, threshold-crossing equilibrium strategies and impose restrictions on the magnitude of the strategic
interaction parameters (see Assumption A in their paper). In a subsection, Aradillas-Lopez (forthcoming)
also suggests an estimation procedure to handle cases in which the assumption is violated, but relies on the
assumption that a single equilibrium is played in the data.
5choice in each game is an unbiased estimator for the conditional choice probabilities within
a particular equilibrium (see, for example, Brock and Durlauf (2007), p.58). Even when all
players have identical payo functions (ui() and i()) and private information distributions
(FijX) though, asymmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria with dierent conditional choice prob-
abilities across players may arise. This will happen for instance when the (common)  is
negative. When the equilibrium conditional choice probabilities dier across players and/or
number of players in each game is small (as is typically the case in the empirical games
literature), the conditional choice probabilities will not be reliably estimated within individ-
ual games. It is then necessary to pool data across games in which the same equilibrium is
played so as to estimate the choice probabilities using more data. In this case, testing for
multiple equilibria is of interest in its own right. Besides, most of the known methods for
semiparametric estimation of incomplete information games (without explicitly specifying
an equilibrium selection rule) has relied on the existence of a single equilibrium in the data
(e.g. Aradillas-Lopez (forthcoming), Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (forthcoming)
and Tang (2009)).4 Hence it is imperative to devise a formal test for the assumption of
unique equilibrium in the data-generating process. The test we propose in this paper ex-
ploits the observation (also mentioned in the parametric model by Sweeting (2009)) that if
private signals are i.i.d. across individuals, players' actions must be independent in a single
equilibrium but correlated when there are multiple equilibria.
An innovation of our test for multiple equilibria is to use a stepwise multiple testing
procedure to infer whether each individual player has dierent strategies across the multiple
equilibria in the data-generating process. This is particularly interesting for structural esti-
mation of games involving more than three players, in which a subset of players may stick to
the same strategy across multiple equilibria. Semiparametric methods based on the assump-
tion of a unique equilibrium can still be applied to consistently estimate payo parameters
4For an illustration of how misspecication of the equilibrium selection rule can aect inference in a
complete information game with a small number of players, see Honor e and de Paula (forthcoming).
6for those players who do not switch between strategies in multiple equilibria. Hence, it is
useful to infer the identity of such players from observed distributions of actions.
For a parametric model with constant, state-independent interaction eects, Sweeting
(2009) proposed a procedure to check for multiple equilibria in the data by calculating the
percentage of pairs of players whose actions are correlated. In comparison, we develop
stronger, new results by extending this intuition in a more general context where individual-
specic interaction eects may depend on the states in unrestricted ways. Besides, our test
also addresses two subtle issues not noted in Sweeting (2009).5 First, our test for multiple
BNE in the data is based on testing whether each individual's action is correlated with
the total number of competitors choosing the same action. Therefore, our test has power
under alternatives in which multiple BNE exist in the data with only a very small number
of players switching strategies across the multiple equilibria.6 Second, we apply a multiple
testing procedure proposed by Romano and Wolf (2005) to test the joint null hypothesis that
the equilibrium in the data is unique (i.e., that none of the N players has switched between
strategies in the data). Within N   1 steps, the procedure leads to a decision to reject or
not to reject the joint null. And if the joint null is rejected, the procedure infers the exact
identities of players who have switched between strategies in the data. This test is known
to eectively control the family-wise error rate, or the probability of rejecting at least one
of the true null hypotheses. Finally, we provide identication results that do not rely on the
conditional independence of private signals. Key to these results is the existence of groups
or clusters of games for which the same equilibrium is played. For example, a market or
household observed over multiple periods or groups of games from similar cultural traits or
5The procedure used in Sweeting (2009) did not prescribe a decision rule to draw conclusions about the
existence of multiple BNE.
6In such a case, the number of players whose actions are correlated pairwise is very small. For example,
if only 3 players out of a group of 30 actively switch between strategies across multiple equilibria in the data,








< 0:0069. The procedure proposed in
Sweeting (2009) would fail to reject the null of a unique equilibrium in the data in this case.
7geographic region could constitute one such group. Within a given group, permuting players
across games still leads to observations where the same equilibrium is played. Provided
games are independent (even within a group), private signals of players across games will be
independent and permuted versions of the games would mimic the conditional independence
assumption.
The paper proceeds as follows. We present our basic model and empirical character-
ization in the next section. In Section 3, we present the main results on the identication
of the sign of interaction eects. Section 4 outlines general testing procedures for inference.
We generalize our results in section 5. Monte Carlo experiments and an application to joint
retirement are presented in Sections 6 and 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model and Empirical Context
We consider a simultaneous discrete game with incomplete information involving N players.
Each player i chooses an action Di from two alternatives f1;0g. A vector of states X 2 RK
is common knowledge among all players. A vector of private information (or \types")  
(i)N
i=1 2 RN is such that i is only observed by player i. (Throughout the paper we will use
upper case letters for random variables and lower case for their realized values. We use 
R
to denote the support of any generic random vector R.) Conditional on a given state X = x,
private information  is jointly distributed according to the CDF FjX(:jx). The payo for
player i from choosing action 1 is U1i(X;i)  ui(X)+(
P
j6=i Dj)i(X) i, while the return
from the other action U0i(X;i) is normalized to 0. Intuitively, ui(X) species a base return
from action 1 for player i. Meanwhile i(X) captures interaction eects on i's payo due
to another player j who chooses 1. (This specication subsumes that of Sweeting (2009)
in the context of binary choices, since it allows the interaction eects to depend on states
X and ui;i to take general forms.) The opponents' actions can aect the utility of action
one through a more general function of (Dj)j6=i (instead of
P
j6=i Dj) as long as this function
8is known. The return functions (ui;i)N
i=1 and the distribution (though not the realization)
of private information FjX are common knowledge among all players. We maintain the
following major identifying restrictions on FjX throughout the paper.
Assumption 1 Conditional on any x 2 
X, i is independent of (j)j6=i for all i and has
positive density over the RN.
Assumption 1 allows X to be correlated with private information of the players, as
may be desirable in empirical applications. This is a common assumption in the economet-
ric literature dealing with incomplete information simultaneous games (and some dynamic
games). A pure strategy for player i in this Bayesian game is a mapping si : 
X;i ! f0;1g.





1; if ui(X) + i(X)
P
j6=i E[Sj(X;j)jX;i]   i  0
0; otherwise.
and because of Assumption 1, E[Sj(X;j)jX = x;i] = E[Sj(X;j)jX = x]  pj(x).7 Hence,
under this assumption, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) in pure strategies (given state
x) can be characterized by a prole of choice probabilities p(x)  [p1(x);:::;pN(x)] such









for all i = 1;:::;N (1)
where pi(x) is player i's probability of choosing action 1 conditional on the state x and FijX
is the marginal distribution of i conditional on X. Let Lx; denote the set of BNE (as
characterized by solutions in p to (1)) for a given x and structure   f(ui;i)i=1;:::;N;FjXg.
The existence of pure-strategy BNE for any given x follows from Brouwer's Fixed Point
7Given Assumption 1, other players' private types can be easily included in the utility function. If
U1i(X;i)  ui(X) + fi(X; i) + (
P
j6=i Dj)i(X)   i, Assumption 1 implies that E[fi(X; i)jX;i] =
E[fi(X; i)jX] and one can simply focus on ^ U1i(X;i)  ^ ui(X) + (
P
j6=i Dj)i(X)   i where ^ ui(X) 
ui(X) + E[fi(X; i)jX].
9Theorem and the continuity of FijX under Assumption 1. In general there may be multiple
BNE, depending on the specications of FjX, ui and i.
We assume that econometricians have access to a large cross-section of independent
games between N players. In each game, they observe choices of actions by all players and
realized states x, but do not observe (i)N
i=1 or know the form of (ui;i)N
i=1 and FjX. Our
analysis posits (i) that the structure (ui;i)N
i=1 and FjX are xed across all games observed,
and (ii) that the choice data observed is generated by players following the pure strategies
prescribed by BNE. Econometricians are interested in learning (at least some features of)
the structure (ui;i)N
i=1 and FjX from the observable joint distribution of X and (Di)N
i=1.
Suppose the choices observed in the data are known to be generated from a single
BNE in the data-generating process for all x 2 
X. This may arise either because the
solution to (1) is unique or because the equilibrium selection in the data-generating process
is degenerate in one of the multiple solutions. Then (1) oers a link between observable
conditional choice patterns and structural elements (ui;i)N
i=1;FjX. Estimation can be done
under various restrictions on u,  and FjX (see Aradillas-Lopez (forthcoming), Berry and
Tamer (2007), Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (forthcoming) and Tang (2009) for
more details).
This link may nonetheless break down when there are multiple equilibria in the data-
generating process. To see this, let x; be an equilibrium selection mechanism (i.e. a
distribution over Lx;) in the data-generating process that may depend on x and . That
 depends on x captures the idea that, as stated in Myerson (1991) (pp. 371-2), \...in
a game with multiple equilibria, anything that tends to focus the players' attention on
one particular equilibrium, in a way that is commonly recognized, tends to make this the
equilibrium that the players will expect and thus actually implement. The focal equilibrium
could be determined by any of a wide range of possible factors, including environmental
factors and cultural traditions (which fall beyond the scope of analysis in mathematical game
theory), special mathematical properties of the various equilibria, and preplay statements
10made by the players or an outside arbitrator..."
Since X is commonly observed by all players in our model, we allow it to aect the
equilibrium selection mechanism accordingly. For any x such that Lx; is not a singleton,
the conditional choice probability observed in the data is a mixture of the conditional choice






i(x) is the actual marginal probability that i chooses 1 conditional on x observed
from data, and pl  (pl
i)N
i=1 is a generic element in the set of possible BNE Lx;, with l
indexing the equilibria in Lx; and pl
i, the marginal probability for i to choose 1 given x
and  implied in equilibrium l. While the xed point characterization (1) holds for every
single BNE pl 2 Lx; by denition, it does not necessarily hold for the vector of mixture
marginals p  (p
i)N
i=1 observed. Because the data will provide information on the mixtures
of equilibria, not on the individual equilibria themselves, there will be limits to what can be
learned about the structure from the data without imposing additional assumptions. This
point is illustrated in the appendix using results from the literature on identiability (or lack
thereof) in mixture models.
Researchers have taken dierent approaches to deal with the issue of multiple equi-
libria in empirical works. Such strategies include (a) the use of a parametric equilibrium
selection rule; (b) the assumption that only one equilibrium is played in all games; (c) suf-
cient conditions for uniqueness of the equilibrium; and/or (d) partial identication and
estimation of the identied set. Each of these strategies (which can also be combined) has
some limitations. We are interested in constructing a robust way to test for the existence of
multiple equilibria and to recover the sign of interactions under weak stochastic restrictions
on the distribution of private information.
113 Identifying Signs of Interaction Eects
In this section, we show how to detect the presence of multiple BNE in the data observed
and identify signs of interaction eects i(x) for any i under a given state x. The sign
reveals the nature of strategic incentives among players. Compared with earlier works, our
sign identication has several innovations and contributions. First, our test does not invoke
any parametric restrictions on players' preferences or distributions of private information.
Second, it allows the strategic incentives (as captured by the sign of i) to be a function
of states x. Third, our approach is robust to the presence of multiple BNE. If in fact
the existence of multiple BNE at rst precludes complete identication of the structure, it
makes possible the identication of the sign of interaction eects in contrast to states where
equilibrium is unique. This intriguing possibility is outlined, for example, in Manski (1993)8,
and clearly observed in Sweeting (2009).













where El denotes the expectation with respect to the distribution of (Di)N
i=1 induced in
the equilibrium pl 2 Lx;. Dene sign(a) to be 1 if a > 0,  1 if a < 0 and 0 if a = 0.
For any player i 2 f1;:::;Ng, let ~ 
i (x) denote the conditional expectation of the prod-
uct Di(
P





i(x)dx;(pl), where  denotes the true structure, and x; denotes the equilibrium-
selection mechanism in the data generating process. Let p
i(x) be the actual probability that










x; denotes the subset of Lx; that occurs in the data-generating process with
positive probability (i.e., L
+
x;  fpl : x;(pl) > 0g). We say multiple BNE exist in the
8\The prospects for identication may improve if f(;) is non-linear in a manner that generates multiple
social equilibria" (p. 539).
12data-generating process whenever L
+
x; is not a singleton.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. (i) For any given x, multiple BNE exist in
the data-generating process if and only if ~ 
i (x) 6= p
i(x)
i (x) at least for some i; (ii) For all
i and x such that ~ 









i (x)) = sign(i(x))
Proof. Under Assumption 1, Di must be independent of
P
j6=i Dj conditional on x in every
single BNE pl in Lx;.
(Suciency of (i)) Suppose there is a unique BNE in the data-generating process. That is,
L
+






j(x) and ~ 





for all i in state x. Hence ~ 
i (x) = p
i(x)
i (x) for all i.
(Necessity of (i)) Suppose L
+
x; is not a singleton in state x. Then there exists at least
some i and pl;pk 2 L
+
x; such that pl
i 6= pk
i.9 Also note that for a player such as i, i(x) must
necessarily be non-zero. By denition,
~ 



























Suppose i(x) > 0. The equilibrium characterization in (1) implies that there exists a strictly










single pl in Lx;.10 Thus for x given, (2) can be written as
~ 















where z  pl
i(x) and ~ i;x; is a distribution of pl
i(x) induced by the equilibrium selection
mechanism x; dened on Lx;. Thus (2) takes the simple form of the covariance of a
9The choice of l;k in general is specic to i. We suppress this dependence for notational ease.
10The form of gi may depend on  and x in general. We suppress this dependence for notational ease.
13random variable z and a strictly increasing function of itself:
cov(Z;gi(Z)) = E[(Z   E(Z))(gi(Z)   E(gi(Z)))]
= E[(Z   E(Z))(gi(Z)   gi(E(Z)))] + E[(Z   E(Z))(gi(E(Z))   E(gi(Z)))]
= E[(Z   E(Z))(gi(Z)   gi(E(Z)))]
Because gi is strictly increasing in [0;1] for given x, we have z1 > z2 ) gi(z1) > gi(z2).
Consequently, (z   E(Z))(gi(z)   gi(E(Z))) > 0 for any z 6= E(Z), and the covariance is
strictly positive, provided the distribution ~ i;x; is not degenerate on L
+




i (x) > 0 if multiple BNE exist in the data-generating process in state x. The case
with i(x) < 0 is proved by symmetric arguments. The proof of (ii) is already included in
the proof of (i) above.
In applications, one plausible scenario is that in which i(x) = i for any x 2 
x.
In this case, the sign of i is identied as long as multiple equilibria exist on a set of x
with positive probability. If, with probality one, no x induces multiple equilibria in the
data, the conditional choice probabilities will factor for (P-almost) every x. Consequently,
~ 
i (x) = p
i(x)
i (x);(P-a.e.) ) EX(~ 
i (X)) = EX(p
i(X)
i (X)): On the other hand, it is not
dicult to verify that when i(x) = i for any x 2 
X and there are multiple equilibria in
the data-generating process, sign(i) = sign(EX(~ 
i (X)   p
i(X)
i (X))).11
We exploit part (i) in Proposition 1 to devise a test for multiple BNE in the data-




i (x) > 0 only if i(x) > 0 and there exist multiple BNE in state x in the data-
generating process. However, the reverse of this statement only holds when N = 2. This is
because when N  3, there can exist i and x such that multiple BNE exist at x in the data-
generating process and i(x) 6= 0, but pl
i = p
i for all pl
i in L
+
x; so that ~ 
i (x) = p
i(x)
i (x).
The following example illustrates this point.
11One could use this result to devise a directional test as in Section 4.3 to do inference on interaction signs
and multiple equilibria. We focus on the more general case of state-dependent interaction eects.
14Example 1 Consider a simple 3-by-2 game involving three players. Suppress the dependence
on x for notational ease. Let u1 = 0:5, u2 = u3 = 0:3611, i =  1 and i  N(0:10;0:252)




1 = 0:0611; p
1
2 = 0:7756; p
1




1 = 0:0611; p
2
2 = 0:0107; p
2
3 = 0:7756
Player 1 chooses alternative 1 with the same probability in both BNE, while both 2 and 3
play dierent strategies across the two BNE (p1 and p2) with p1
i 6= p2
i for i = 2;3. k
Therefore, part (ii) does not guarantee the identication of signs of i(x) for all i
and x in general, due to the need to distinguish players who do or do not incur the same
probability for choosing 1 across dierent equilibria. Let (x)  fi : pl
i(x) =  pi(x) for some  pi
in all pl 2 L
+
x;g. Obviously  pi(x) = p
i(x) for all i 2 (x). Let c(x) denote the set of players
not in (x). When there is a unique BNE at x in the data-generating process (i.e., L
+
x; is a
singleton), all players in the game belong to (x). When L
+
x; is not a singleton, (x) consists




i (x) = p
i(x)
i (x) if and only if i 2 (x). A corollary to Proposition 1 is that for i and x
such that i 2 c(x), the sign of i(x) is directly identied as the sign of ~ 
i (x)   p
i(x)
i (x).
Additional restrictions are needed in order to identify sign(i(x)) for i 2 (x). For any
given x and i, dene the equivalence class as i(x)  fx0 : ui(x) = ui(x0), i(x) = i(x0),
FijX=x = FijX=x0g. (There is no loss of generality in introducing this notation, since we
allow the possibility that i(x) is a singleton consisting of x only.)
In empirical applications, the equivalence class i(x) is often a non-singleton set that
can happen with positive probability for all i;x. For example, consider entry-exit games
involving N rms. The state variables X may include a vector X0 that consists of market- or
sector-wide factors aecting the demand for goods produced. The vector X may also include
a group of mutually exclusive vectors (Xi)N
i=1 with Xi capturing observable rm-specic
factors that aect only i's protability but not its rivals (e.g., Xi may include labor costs
15or local regulations pertaining to the geographic location of rm i). The vector of private
information (i)N
i=1 may well capture all other rm-specic factors (such as idiosyncratic
costs) aecting protability and unobservable to opponent rms and econometricians. In
situations in which, given one's own states, the rivals' states (such as their labor costs) have
no bearing on one's own protability, then i is independent of X i given X0;Xi. In such an
environment, i(x) = f~ x : (~ x0; ~ xi) = (x0;xi)g where x = (x0;xi;x i).
Assumption 2 For all i and x s.t. i(x) 6= 0, 9!i(x)  i(x) with positive probability such
that 8x0 2 !i(x), either (i) i 2 c(x) [ c(x0) or (ii) i 2 (x) \ (x0) and p
i(x) 6= p
i(x0).
More intuitively, Assumption 2 is satised as long as there is enough variation in the
equivalence class i(x) to induce changes in pl
i(x0) in equilibria that happen with positive
probability in the data. If i(x) is a singleton (for i), this will happen when x induces
multiple equilibria and the pi(x) is not the same in all equilibria. For non-singleton i(x),
Assumption 2 may hold even when the equilibrium is unique or when pi(x) is the same
across all equilibria. In some empirical contexts, researchers know a priori which i;x satisfy
i(x) 6= 0. (For example, when interaction eects are known to be increasing or decreasing
in the number of players choosing the same action together, then i(x) are non-zero for all
i;x.) In such cases, Assumption 2 can be checked directly using observable distributions as
Proposition 2 suggests below. The following example illustrates in detail how more primitive
conditions can lead to Assumption 2 in simple examples.
Example 2 Consider a 2-by-2 game with states X  (X0;X1;X2) where Assumption 1
holds and ui;i;FijX depend only on X0i  (X0;Xi) and not on the other state variables.













Then i(x)  fx0 : x0
0i = x0ig. Within this framework, Assumption 2 can be satised in a
16given state x  (x0;x1;x2) under several dierent specications. First, consider the following
specication:
For i = 1;2, 9!i(x)  i(x) with positive probability such that 8x0 2 !i(x),






for all t 2 [0;1] where j 6= i is the identity of the other player. (For example, this inequality
can hold if j(x0j) = j(x0
0j), Fjjx0j = Fjjx0
0j but uj(x0j) 6= uj(x0
0j) for all x0 2 !i(x).)
The event \1 2 (x) \ (x0) and p
1(x) = p
1(x0)" can never happen for any x0 2 !1(x)
whenever 1(x) 6= 0. Suppose it does. Then pl
1(z) = p
1(z) in all pl 2 L
+
z; for z 2 fx;x0g.
Therefore (4) implies pl
2(z) = p
2(z) in all pl 2 L
+
z; for z 2 fx;x0g and 2 2 (x) \ (x0). Then
p
1(x) = p
1(x0) and the inequality (5) above suggests p
2(x) 6= p
2(x0) for all x0 2 !1(x). This
in turn implies p
1(x) 6= p
1(x0) in (4) by denition of x0 2 !1(x)  1(x) whenever 1(x) 6= 0.
This contradicts the supposition that p
1(x) = p
1(x0). Hence Assumption 2 holds for i = 1 if
1(x) 6= 0. Symmetric arguments prove the case with i = 2. k
Note that when i(x) = 0 for either i = 1 or 2, i 2 (x) \ (x0) and p
i(x) = p
i(x0) for
all x0 2 i(x). This nevertheless does not violate Assumption 2, which covers only the case
with i(x) 6= 0.





j6=i Dj;gjXg 2 i(x)

  E(Di;gjXg 2 i(x))E
X
j6=i Dj;gjXg 2 i(x)

where g indexes the independent games observed in the data, and Di;g is the decision made
by i in game g.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, sign(i(x)) = sign(	i(x)) for all
i, x.
Proof. Let x; denote the equilibrium selection mechanism dened over L
+
x; under state
x and let 
x; denote
R
i(x) x0;dF(x0jX0 2 i(x)) (where F(:jX 2 S) is the distribution





i;x; denote the distribution of pl
i(x) induced by 
x;. Then (1)
and Assumption 2 imply that there exists an increasing (or decreasing) function gi s.t.
pl
i(x0) = gi(l
i(x0)) for all pl 2 L
+
x0; and all x0 2 i(x) if i(x0) > 0 (or < 0 respectively).
Specically, gi(t)  FijX=x0(ui(x0)+i(x0)t) for t 2 [0;N  1]. Note that this function is xed
for all x0 2 i(x) due to Assumption 2. Also since !i(x) happens with a positive probability
under Assumption 2, the distribution 












































where z  pl
i(x). Then the same argument as in Proposition 1 shows 	i(x) > 0 (or < 0)
whenever i(x) > 0 (or < 0) for all i;x. When i(x) = 0, pl
i(x0) must be the same for all
pl 2 Lx0; and all x0 2 i(x), and the distribution 
i;x; is degenerate. Hence 	i(x) = 0.
This completes the proof.
If Assumption 2 fails for some i and x while Assumption 1 still holds, then 	i(x) must
be zero, and we cannot make decisions about the sign of i(x). This is because 	i(x) = 0
either because i(x) = 0 or because Assumption 2 fails.
4 Testing Multiple BNE and Interaction Signs
When N = 2, multiple equilibria only arise when sign(1(X)) = sign(2(X)). In this
case, both players will employ distinct conditional choice probabilities across the equilibria.
Testing for multiple equilibria and inference on the interaction eect sign can be simply
based on the sample correlation of actions between the two players (given X).12 Given this,
we focus on the more interesting case where N  3 in subsections 4.1 and 4.2.
12In fact the detection of multiplicity and sign inference can be based on the statistic ^ 	(X)  ^ 	1(X) =
^ 	2(X) dened in subsection 4.3.
184.1 A Wald Test for Multiple BNE in the Data-Generating Pro-
cess
Below, we propose a test for the presence of multiple equilibria in the data in an empirical
context where researchers observe states and players' decisions from a large cross-section of
independent games (indexed by g = 1;:::;G), each dened by the same structural elements
(ui;i)iN;FjX. Semiparametric estimation of games with incomplete information typically
refrains from parametric assumptions on primitives or the equilibrium selection mechanism
at the cost of assuming that (conditional on the same observable covariates) the data ob-
served are rationalized by the same BNE (see Aradillas-Lopez (forthcoming), Bajari, Hong,
Krainer, and Nekipelov (forthcoming) and Tang (2009)). The applicability of these semi-
parametric approaches naturally hinges on validity of the \single equilibrium" assumption.13
The procedures below formally test the existence of multiple BNE in the data observed under
the maintained assumption of conditionally independent private signals.
The null hypothesis that \multiple BNE exist in the data for state x" is equivalently
formulated as follows, based on Proposition 1:
H0 : i(x) = 0 8i  N (6)
H1 : 9 i s:t: i(x) 6= 0





j6=i fE[DiDjjx]   E(Dijx)E(Djjx)g. Throughout this
and the next section, we focus on a simple case where X contains only discrete coordinates.
Then the sample analogs of expectations conditional on x are simple sample averages across
games with X = x. We suppress x for notational ease when there is no ambiguity. As
mentioned in the beginning of this section, we also assume that N  3.
For any subset I  f1;:::;Ng, let DI;g  i2IDi;g and I  E(DI;g1(Xg = x)). Let
13As mentioned in the introduction, \social interaction" models do not rely on this assumption but re-
quire the number of agents in each game to be large so that within equilibrium choice probabilities can be
consistently estimated from average choices in each game.








-vector consisting of 0;i and ij for












1(Xg = x) ; G  (0;:::;i;:::;ij;:::)
0
where G is the vector of sample analogs for . By the multivariate central limit theorem,
G1=2(G   )
d  ! N(0 ~ N;) as G ! 1, where 0 ~ N is a ~ N-vector of zeros and  is the
corresponding variance-covariance matrix.









. Let TG be a N-vector with its i-th coordinate
dened as
















0) as G ! 1
where   (i)N
i=1. The jacobian V is a N-by- ~ N matrix, with its i-th row Vi dened by
the following table (where (m);Vi;(m) denote the m-th coordinates of two ~ N-vectors  and
Vi respectively, and j;k 6= i),




















Let ^ ; ^ V be estimates for ;V respectively, constructed by replacing 0;I with
non-parametric estimates









14If 0 = 1, an unconditional version of our procedure can be easily derived.
20Proposition 3 Suppose the data have G independent games with the same underlying struc-
ture and both V and  are full-rank. Then
G(TG )






df=N as G ! 1:
Under the null hypothesis,  = 0N and the chi-squared distribution can be used to
obtain critical values for the test statistic GT0
G(^ V^ ^ V
0
)
 1TG. Because N  3 and condi-
tional choice probabilities are bounded away from 0 and 1 (by Assumption 1), the full-rank
conditions above are not restrictive.
4.2 Inference of Players With Multiple Equilibrium Strategies
When N  3, in addition to testing the joint hypothesis that  = 0N in (6), one would
also be interested in nding out the identities of the set of players i in c(x), i.e., all those
who actively mix strategies across multiple BNE (indexed by pl
i(x)). As mentioned in the
introduction, this is interesting in particular for games with more than three players, where
a subset of players may stick to the same strategy across multiple equilibria. Available
semiparametric methods based on the assumption of unique equilibrium can still be applied
to consistently estimate payo parameters for those players who follow the same strategies
across all equilibria in the game. Therefore it is useful to infer the identity of these players
from the distributions of actions observed.
To accommodate this possibility, we resort to the statistical literature on multiple
comparisons (for a recent survey, see Lehmann and Romano (2005)). This literature considers
decision strategies that aggregate the individual tests for each i conditional on x:
H
0
i : i(x) = 0
H
1
i : i(x) 6= 0
Given individual test statistics for each of the i  N hypotheses, our objective is to dene a
decision rule that controls the family-wise error rate, or the probability of rejecting at least
21one of the true null hypotheses. More formally:
FWEP = ProbPfReject at least one H
0
i : i(x) = 0 where i 2 I0(P)g
where the subscript P indicates the data-generating process and I0(P)  f1;:::;Ng is the
set of indices i of true null hypotheses under P. A multiple testing procedure asymptotically
controls the FWEP at the rate  if limsupG!+1 FWEP   for any P.
Well-known methods that asymptotically control for the family-wise error rate include
the Bonferroni and the Holm's method. Both methods can be described in terms of the p-
values for each of the individual hypotheses (indexed by i) above. We denote these p-values
by ^ pG;i. The Bonferroni method at level  rejects i if ^ pG;i  =N. The Holm's procedure,
which is less conservative than the Bonferroni method, follows a stepwise strategy. (For
notational convenience, we suppress the dependence of the hypotheses and test statistics
on x.) The Holm's procedure starts by ordering the p-values in ascending order: ^ pG;(1) 
^ pG;(2)    ^ pG;(N). Let H0
jk : jk = 0 denote the single hypothesis corresponding to the k-
th smallest p-value (i.e. ^ pG;jk = ^ pG;(k)). Holm's stepwise method proceeds as follows. In the
rst step, compare ^ pG;(1) with =N. If ^ pG;(1)  =N, then accept all individual hypotheses
and the procedure ends. Otherwise, reject the individual null hypothesis H0
j1 : j1 = 0 and
move on to the second step. In the second step, the remaining N   1 hypotheses are all
accepted if ^ pG;(2)  =(N  1). Otherwise reject H0
j2 : j2 = 0 and continue to the next step.
More generally, compare ^ pG;(k) with =(N   k + 1) in the k-th step. Accept all remaining
N  (k  1) hypotheses if ^ pG;(k)  =(N  k +1). Otherwise, reject H0
jk and move on to the
next step. Continue doing so until all remaining hypotheses are accepted, or all hypotheses
are rejected one by one in N steps.
Though less conservative than the Bonferroni method, the Holm's procedure can still
be improved upon if one takes into account the dependence between the individual test
statistics. To achieve this, we follow recent contributions by van der Laan, Dudoit, and
Pollard (2004) and Romano and Wolf (2005).15 Ordering the test statistics in descending
15The following description closely follows the presentation in Romano and Wolf (2005). For similar
22order, we let TG;(1)  TG;(2)    TG;(N). In the k-th step, a critical level ck is obtained and
those hypotheses with TG;  ck are rejected. Let Rk be the number of hypotheses rejected
after the rst k   1 steps (i.e. the number of hypotheses rejected at the beginning of the
k-th step). As before, let H0
ik denote the hypothesis whose test statistic is the k-th largest
(i.e. TG;ik = TG;(k)). Ideally, we want to obtain c1 such that:






TG;(j)   ij  y

 1   

where all statements are implicitly conditional on X = x. Subsequently, ck is dened as






TG;(j)   ij  y

 1   

(also conditional on X = x). As pointed out in the references cited, because P is unknown
in practice, we replace P by an estimate ^ PG and dene
^ ck  ck(1   ; ^ PG) = inf











 1   

(7)
where we follow Romano and Wolf (2005) and use T 
G;(j) and 
ij to highlight that the
sampling distribution of the test statistics is under ^ PG (not P). The following algorithm
summarizes the stepwise multiple testing procedure we adopt from Romano and Wolf (2005).
Algorithm 1 (Basic Non-studentized Step-down Procedure)
Step 1. Relabel the hypotheses in descending order of the test statistics TG;i. Let H0
ik denote
the individual null hypothesis whose test statistic is the k-th largest.
Step 2. Set k = 1 and R1 = 0.
Step 3. For Rk + 1  s  N, if TG;(s)   ^ ck > 0, then reject the individual null H0
is.
Step 4. If no (further) null hypotheses are rejected, then stop. Otherwise, let Rk+1 denote
the total number of hypotheses rejected so far (i.e. Rk plus the number of hypotheses rejected
in the k-th step), and set k = k + 1. Then return to Step 3 above.
strategies controlling generalizations of the family-wise error rate, see Romano and Shaikh (2006). A recent
application of such generalizations is Moon and Perron (2009).
23In addition to estimating ^ ck via bootstrap, we also consider an alternative approach that
uses the fact that the test statistics have a normal limiting distribution with a consistently
estimable variance-covariance matrix.16 We summarize the two approaches for estimating ^ ck
in the following algorithms.
Algorithm 2.1 (Computing ^ ck Using Bootstrap)
Step 1. Let ik and Rk be dened as in Algorithm 1 above.
Step 2. Generate B bootstrap data sets.














Step 5. Then compute ^ ck as the (1   )-th empirical quantile of the B values fmax
;b
G;kgbB.
Algorithm 2.2 (Computing ^ ck Using Parametric Simulations)
Step 1. Estimate the covariance matrix of the vector of test statistics that corresponds to hy-
potheses which are not rejected after the rst k 1 steps, i.e. (TG;(Rk+1);TG;(Rk+2);:::;TG;(N)).
Denote the estimate by ^ k.
Step 2. Simulate a data set of M observations fvmgM
m=1 from the (N  Rk)-dimensional mul-
tivariate normal distribution with parameters (0N Rk; ^ k), where 0k is a k-vector of zeros.
Step 3. Then ^ ck is computed as the (1 )-th empirical quantile of the maximum coordinates
of vm in the simulated data.17
We also use a studentized version of the multiple testing method as in Romano and
Wolf (2005). Let ^ G;k denote the estimates for the standard deviation of the test statistic
TG;k. To do so, we need an analogue of (7):
^ dk  dk(1   ; ^ PG)  inf











 1   

(8)
16See footnote 21 in Romano and Wolf (2005).
17M can be large relative to the number of bootstrap samples B in Algorithm 2.1.
24where ^ 
G;i are the estimates for standard deviations of TG;i computed from bootstrap samples.
The studentized stepwise procedure is summarized in the following algorithm. As before, let
Rk denote the total number of hypotheses that are not rejected in the rst k   1 steps.
Algorithm 3 (Studentized Step-down Procedure)
Step 1. Relabel the individual hypotheses in descending order of studentized test statistics
ZG;i  TG;i=^ G;i, where ^ G;i are estimates for standard deviation of TG;i.
Step 2. Set k = 1 and R1 = 0.
Step 3. For Rk + 1  s  S, if ZG;is > ^ dj, then reject the individual null H0
is.
Step 4. If no further individual null hypotheses are rejected, stop. Otherwise, let Rk+1 denote
the total number of hypotheses rejected so far and set k = k+1. Then return to Step 3 above.
The critical values for the studentized stepwise method ^ dk are computed by an algorithm













G;is   TG;is)=^ 
;b
G;is in Step 4.
In Section 6, we report the performance of three tests based on stepwise multiple
testing procedures: (a) the non-studentized test with ^ ck computed from parametric simula-
tions; (b) the non-studentized test with ^ ck computed via bootstrap; and (c) the studentized
test with ^ dk computed via bootstrap. Because our setting corresponds to the smooth func-
tion model with i.i.d. data (Scenario 3.1 in Romano and Wolf (2005)), both strategies yield
consistent tests that asymptotically control the family-wise error rate at level . This would
obtain from a slight modication in Theorem 3.1 in Romano and Wolf (2005) to accommo-
date two-sided hypotheses as indicated in Section 5 of that paper.
4.3 Inference on Signs of Interaction Eects
This section proposes a simple test for the sign of interaction eects for a player i in a given
state x. It relies on the characterization in Proposition 2 and will hold when x induces
multiple equilibria and choice probabilities vary across equilibria or when there are excluded
25regressors as discussed in Section 3. To x ideas, we focus on the simple case with discrete
X where any x in the support can happen with strictly positive probabilities. For any i;x,
dene
^ 	i(x)  ^  
 1
i;x;1 ^  i;x;2   ^  
 2
i;x;1 ^  i;x;3 ^  i;x;4
where
^  i;x;1  G
 1 X
g













^  i;x;3  G
 1 X
g











When i(x) = fxg, ^ 	i coincides with TG;i introduced in subsection 4.1. In this sense, ^ 	i
generalizes TG;i for a non-singleton i(x). For notational ease, we drop the subscript i;x
from the estimators when there is no ambiguity. Dene
^  
2
6 6 6 6
6 6 6
4
^  1(1   ^  1) ^  2(1   ^  1) ^  3(1   ^  1) ^  4(1   ^  1)
^  2(1   ^  1) ^  5   ^  2
2 ^  2(1   ^  3) ^  5   ^  2 ^  4
^  3(1   ^  1) ^  2(1   ^  3) ^  3   ^  2
3 ^  2   ^  3 ^  4




7 7 7 7
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  ^  2 ^  
 2
1 + 2 ^  3 ^  4 ^  
 3
1 ^  
 1
1   ^  
 2
1 ^  4   ^  
 2
1 ^  3
i
where ^  and ^ V are analogous to the objects dened in subsection 4.1. Using the Delta
Method and Slutsky's Theorem it is straightforward to verify that





^ 	i(x)   	i(x)

d  ! N(0;1) as G ! 1
26Testing the existence of multiple equilibria in the data and the sign of i(x) amounts to
testing the following three hypotheses:
H+ : 	i(x) > 0 H0 : 	i(x) = 0 H  : 	i(x) < 0:
Rejection of H0 in favor of H+ is indicative of multiple equilibria and a positive sign for
i(x). Analogously, rejection of H0 in favor of H  is indicative of multiple equilibria and
a negative sign for i(x). Acceptance of H0 suggests a unique equilibrium in the data and
judgement on the sign of i(x) is withheld. Using the test statistic
p
G(^ V^ ^ V
0
) 1=2^ 	i(x),
we can choose critical regions at the two tails, each resulting in the rejection of H0 in favor
of either H+ or H .18 Proofs of consistency and asymptotic levels of the test should readily
follow.
5 Further Results
5.1 Dependence in 
It is possible to relax Assumption 1 regarding (conditional) independence of private informa-
tion variables across players if one can ascribe groups of observations to the same equilibrium
(whenever they have identical covariates). We retain the assumption that i has positive
density over R. We refer to sets of observations playing the same equilibrium as groups. For
example, a market or household observed two or more times or a geographic cluster of games
could comprise a group. We assume that:
Assumption 3 Game observations are clustered into (non-singleton) groups such that the
equilibrium played within each cluster is the same.
In the spirit of Myerson (1991)'s remark, a group may be dened by a geographical
region or cultural trait. It is also common in the literature to rely on multiple observations
18This is a directional hypothesis test. For a recent survey, see Shaer (2006).
27of a static game (e.g. market or household) (see Sweeting (2009)). As long as equilibria do
not change across these observations, they constitute what we call a cluster. For simplicity
here, assume that there are only two players and we have access to two observations from
a particular cluster with covariate realization equal to x. The idea here is to permute the
players across games from the same cluster to generate independence of actions when there
is only one equilibrium. Observations are assumed to be iid. Because games within a given
group follow the same equilibrium by assumption, even after the permutation of players,
the same equilibrium will still be played in the (permuted) game. Since the games are
independent (even within a group), the private signals for two players of dierent games
within a group will be independent. Consequently, the permutation allows us to mimic
Assumption 1 even if signals are not independent within a game. With two players, the







j(x;j)jx;i)   i  0

(9)
for i 6= j 2 f1;2g. Let  = (1;2) and 0 = (0
1;0
2) denote private information variables
in dierent observations from the same cluster. Analogously, the covariates for these two
observations are given by X and X0. More concretely, if the group consists of observations of
a household for two periods, primed and non-primed variables will correspond to observations
in dierent periods. Permuting actions consists of pairing the husband's action in period one

















since F;0jX=X0=x(;jx) = FjX=x(jx)F0jX0=x(jx). Consequently, when a single equilibrium
is played in the data, the (permutation) covariance of actions will be zero (regardless of
whether Assumption 1 holds).
If there is more than one equilibrium in the data, the covariance of actions within
permuted games (i.e. hypothetical games between pairs of players that are only matched









0 = x)jX = X















0 = x)jX = X













0 = x)jX = X
0 = x]
where S0
1 = S1(x;1) and S0
2 = S2(x;0
2) and the second and third equalities follow from
conditional indenpendence of  and 0. The conditional covariance (given 2;0



















































2). The sign argument now follows if we show that










1) if i(x) > 0 (and vice-versa when i(x) < 0). For this, the following
assumption is sucient (though not necessary):
Assumption 4 For any two equilibria in the support of the equilibrium selection mechanism
and any player i, Sl and Sk, either Sl
i(x;i)  Sk
i (x;i) for any i 2 R or Sl
i(x;i)  Sk
i (x;i)
for any i 2 R.
This condition will hold in particular under conditional independence of privately
observed variables. It also holds when the equilibrium strategies are monotone as assumed
in Wan and Xu (2010) and implicitly in Berry and Tamer (2007). A sucient condition
for this is the Single Crossing Property from Athey (2001) (see also Reny (2009)). The
assumption can hold more generally though.











1) whenever i(x) > 0 (see equation 9). Because of the assumption above, we have
Sl
1(x;1)  Sk
1(x;1) for every 1. It should also be that f1 : Sl
1(x;1) > Sk
1(x;1)g has
positive measure. Suppose this is not the case and Sl
1(x;1) = Sk
1(x;1) for (almost-)every
1. If this holds though, E(Sl
1(x;1)jx;2) = E(Sk





2(x;2)jx;1) contradicting the original
assumption. We then obtain that E(Sl
1(x;1)jx;2) > E(Sk
1(x;1)jx;2). Consequently the
conditional covariance above is positive. Similarly we can show that the covariance is negative
when i(x) < 0. This discussion is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold and games are iid. (i) For any given x,
multiple BNE exist in the data-generating process if and only if cov(S1;S0
2jX = X0 = x) 6= 0;
(ii) For all x such that cov(S1;S0




0 = x)) = sign(i(x)); i = f1;2g
6 Monte Carlo Simulations
In this section we explore Monte Carlo experiments to illustrate the strategy presented in
the previous section. The rst design reproduces Example 1 and displays multiple equilibria.
We use it to analyze the inference procedure on the existence of multiple equilibria and on
the interaction signs when more than one equilibrium exists. Design 2 displays only one
equilibrium and we use it to illustrate our procedure when multiple equilibria are absent but
an excluded variable exists.
Design 1 We study the nite sample performance of the tests for multiple equilibria in
Section 4 using a simple design of a 3-by-2 game in Example 1. The design is conditional on
some state x and this dependence is suppressed for notational convenience. For some xed
state, let the players' baseline payos be u1 = 0:5 and u2 = u3 = 0:3611, respectively, and
30let i =  1 and i  N( = 0:1;2 = 0:252) for all i. Let  denote the probability with
which the rst Bayesian Nash equilibrium in (3) shows up in the data-generating process.
We experiment with  = 0:1, 0:25 or 0:5 and sample sizes G = 1000 or 3000.



















  i;g  0
)
where in each game g  G, Wg is simulated from a Bernoulli distribution with success
probability , i;g from N(0:1;0:252) and pls are propensity-scores in the two Bayesian Nash
equilibria. For each (;G), we simulate S = 1000 data sets. For each data set, we employ
the stepwise multiple testing procedure as described in Section 4.2, and make a decision to
reject or not to reject the null hypothesis that there is a unique equilibrium in the data-
generating process. We experiment with three dierent approaches for choosing the critical
level ^ ck in Section 4.2: (i) simulation using estimated covariance matrix of TG; (ii) bootstrap;
and (iii) studentized bootstrap (Algorithms 3.2 and 4.2 in Romano and Wolf (2005)). For
meaningful comparison between these three approaches, we use the same number of simulated
multivariate normal vectors in (i) as the number of bootstrap samples drawn in (ii) and (iii)
(which is denoted by B). We experiment with B = 1000;2000. In Table 1 below, we report
the probability of rejecting at least one true null hypothesis (i.e., rejecting H0 for i = 1)
calculated from the S = 1000 simulated data sets in columns RP 1;2;3.
Table 2 presents the tests of interaction signs for each of the three players. Since
player 1 has the same conditional choice probabilities in the two equilibria, the test withholds
judgment for most of the simulations. It detects a negative sign for the other two players.
Design 2 In this design, we consider a 3-player-by-2-action game where Assumption 2
is satised. The baseline payo for player i is ui(xi) = 1 + xi where x1 2 f 1;2g and
x2 2 f 1=2;3=2g and x3 2 f 1;3g. Covariate realizations have the same probability. The
state-dependent interaction eect for i is i(xi) = xi where  is a parameter that controls
the scale of the interaction eect. The private information i is uniformly distributed over
31( ci;ci), where ci = 2(1 + xi + jxij).19 Table 3 lists the marginal choice probabilities, or
propensity scores, pi(x)  Pr(i chooses 1jx) in the unique Bayesian Nash equilibria for each
state x  (x1;x2;x3). It is easy to verify that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is unique for
all x from Table 3, since all i is uniformly distributed and all propensity scores are strictly
between 0 and 1.
In Design 2, strategic interaction eects are state-dependent and individual-specic.
For player 1, states in the rst four rows in Table 3 form an equivalent class, while the other
four rows form another equivalent class. We simulate S = 1000 samples, each with sample
size G = 5000. For each of these samples, we calculate the test statistics ^ 	 as dened in
Section 4 and apply the following decision rule. If ^ 	 <  1:64, then reject H2 (no interaction
eect) in favor of H3 (negative interaction eect). If ^ 	 > 1:64, then reject H2 in favor of
H1 (positive interaction eect). Otherwise, do not reject H2. Table 4 below summarizes
the nite sample performance of our test. The two entries [q1;q3] in the brackets report
percentages of tests in S = 1000 simulations where H2 is rejected in favor of H1 (i.e., q1)
and the percentage of rejections in favor of H3 (i.e. q3), respectively. Recall that the sign of
interaction eects for i(xi) is the same as the sign of xi in our design as  > 0.
7 Empirical Illustration
As an application for the methodology outlined in the previous sections, we investigate the
strategic behavior of couples over retirement decisions. A majority of retirees are married
and many studies indicate that a signicant proportion of individuals retire within a year
of their spouse. Among the articles documenting the joint retirement of couples (and data
sets employed) one could cite Hurd (1990) (New Beneciary Survey), Blau (1998) (Retire-
ment History Study), Gustman and Steinmeier (1992) (National Longitudinal Survey of
Mature Women), Michaud (2004) (Health and Retirement Study) and Banks, Blundell, and
19The parameter ci is chosen this way to ensure there is a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium under each
state.
32Casanova Rivas (2007) (English Longitudinal Study of Ageing). Even though this is espe-
cially the case for couples closer in age, the distribution of dierences in retirement timing
between partners typically displays a spike at zero, regardless of the age dierence (see, for
instance, Figure 7 and Table 3 in Casanova Rivas (2009)). Following our framework, let H
denote the eect of the wife's retirement on the husband and W denote the eect of the
husband's retirement on the wife. For a two-player game, it is not hard to show that multiple
equilibria can occur only when sign(H) = sign(W).
We use the Health and Retirement Study for this analysis. The HRS is a panel data
set, representative of non-institutionalized individuals and their spouses. There are currently
eight available waves, covering every two years from 1992 to 2006. The study originally
started with a cohort of individuals born between 1931 and 1941 (otherwise known as the
HRS cohort). Soon after, the study added individuals in other cohorts. The HRS cohort has
nevertheless been the most commonly studied, not only because more waves of information
are available, but also because the cohort has been more frequently linked to other databases.
We use couples in which at least one partner belongs to this cohort (i.e., born in the 1930s).
Table 5 presents summary statistics on retirement for this cohort during the eight waves
available.
For evidence of informational asymmetries within the couple regarding joint retire-
ment, we present a two-way table with answers by husbands and wives to whether he or she
expects to retire with his or her spouse.20 We view the fact that a substantial proportion of
couples showed opposing predictions as evidence that they are not fully aware of the other
half's preference for retirement. If they had complete information, they would not have
formed contradicting expectations about the possibility of joint retirement. Using a dierent
survey focussing on elicited perceptions of spouse and own satisfaction within the marriage,
Friedberg and Stern (2009) also show evidence of information asymmetries within marriage.
Because there are only two players, the statistic G1=2(^ V^ ^ V
0
) 1=2^ 	, calculated as
20This variable is available for Wave 1 only.
33prescribed in the third subsection of Section 4 is asymptotically standard normal under the
null of no multiplicity and can be used to infer the existence of multiple equilibria and, in
that case, the sign of the interaction eects.21 The results conditioning on age dierences
between husband and wife (husband's age - wife's age) are reported in Table 7. The test
statistic is computed as prescribed in the previous sections and positive (negative) values
of the statistic correspond to positive (negative) values of both H and W. According to
the results in Section 4, under the null of a unique equilibrium played in the data, the test
statistic we use below should follow a standard normal distribution. We nd evidence of
coordination motives between husband and wife for couples in which wives are at most two
years older than the husband across all eight waves of the HRS data. Evidence for couples
in which the wife is much older than the husband is weaker. Similar ndings obtain with
the other cohorts in the HRS and conditioning variables.
Since the decision to retire may depend on more than the dierence in age, we also
perform the analysis above for a set of variables typically used in this literature. We focus on
the fourth wave of the survey (1998), when respondents are in their early sixties. Following
the literature, in addition to age dierence, we condition on household wealth (tercile) and
whether at least one member is in poor health. Table 8 presents more detailed information
for these variables in 1998 (Wave 4).
Table 9 presents the test statistics with the conditioning variables mentioned above.
The statistics are inconclusive for couples in which at least one of the partners is in poor
health but tend to conrm our previous results otherwise.
Of course, some caveats apply. First, we assume that the decision problem is static.
This would be reasonable when agents are impatient and/or when moving in and out of
retirement is relatively costless so that individual choices can be treated as a succession
of static decisions. Second, another explanation for the coincidence in retirement decisions
(aside from taste interactions) is that husband and wife receive correlated (unobservable or
21Since there are only two players, ^ 	H = ^ 	W  ^ 	 (see footnote 12).
34omitted) shocks, driving them to retirement at similar times. This is outside the scope of
the model we analyze, since Assumption 1 would then be violated.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how a condition typically employed in the analysis of simultane-
ous games of incomplete information leads to a simple and easily implementable test for the
signs of interaction eects as well as the existence of multiple equilibria in the data-generating
process. Inference of the signs of state-dependent and individual-specic interaction eects
can be done under minimal assumptions that require only the conditional independence of
private information, and the existence of state variables satisfying appropriate exclusion re-
strictions. Besides, given that many of the suggested methods for estimating and making
inferences in such environments rely on the assumption that only one equilibrium is played
in the data, this nding is relevant for the implementation of these techniques. With discrete
covariates, such inference is implementable using well-known results in the multiple testing
literature. When a continuous covariate is included, the testing procedure should account
for the boundaries between regions with a dierent number of equilibria. Finally, the condi-
tional independence assumption is also found in dynamic games of incomplete information.
In those settings, optimal decision rules involve not only equilibrium beliefs but continua-
tion value functions that may also change across equilibria. Though a detailed analysis is
deferred to future research, we speculate that our results generalize to such games under
certain additional assumptions. In particular, the characterization of optimal policy rules
in that context suggests that the existence of a unique equilibrium in the data can still be
detected by the lack of correlation in actions across players of a given game as presented in
the current paper.22
22With two actions, the optimal policy for a specic equilibrium would prescribe a decision rule like
Si(X;i) = 1[ui(X) + i(X)
P
j6=i pj(X) + E(Vi(X0;0
i)jX;i;Di = 1)   i  E(Vi(X0;0
i)jX;i;Di = 0)]
where  is a discount factor, primed variables refer to the following period and Vi() is a continuation value
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39Appendix:
Let  denote the structure (ui;i)N
i=1 and FjX, and let Lx; denote the choice probabilities
proles corresponding to BNE for a given x and parameter . That is, Lx;  fp 2 [0;1]N : p
solves (1) for  and the given xg. We let x; be an equilibrium selection mechanism. The
following proposition illustrates the limits of what can be learned about the structure from
the mixture data without imposing additional assumptions. Let #A denote the cardinality
of set A and dene g : [0;1]N  ! [0;1]N as
g(p(x);x;) 
 














Then the structure is not identied if #Lx; > 2N 2
N .
Proof. We rst show that, for given x, the number of equilibria is nite. An equilibrium
vector p(x) is a xed point to the mapping depicted on display (1). Equivalently, we represent
it as a solution to the following equation:
g(p(x);x;) = 0:
Notice that f0;1g \ Fijx(R) = ; for any i, given the full support of i. Consequently, for a







the Implicit Function Theorem directly implies that the set of xed points to (10) is discrete
(i.e. its elements are isolated points: each element is contained in a neighborhood with
no other solutions to the system). Innitesimal changes in p(x) will imply a displacement
of g(;x;) from zero, so local perturbations in p(x) cannot be solutions to the system of
equations. Since p(x) 2 [0;1]N, the set of solutions is a bounded subset of RN. In RN, every
40bounded innite subset has a limit point (i.e., an element for which every neighborhood
contains another element in the set) (Theorem 2.42 in Rudin (1976)). Consequently, a
discrete set, having no limit points, cannot be both bounded and innite. Being bounded
and discrete, the set of solutions is nite.
In this case, the observed joint distribution of equilibrium actions is a nite mixture.










For a given x, the problem of retrieving this cdf and mixing probabilities from observed data
is analyzed by Hall, Neeman, Pakyari, and Elmore (2005). In that paper, the authors show
that the choice and mixing probabilities (pl
i(x) and x;) cannot be obtained from observa-
tion of (y1;:::;yN;x;) if #Lx; > 2N 2
N . Consequently, it is necessary for identiability
of the relevant probabilities that #Lx;  2N 2
N . Finally, if the equilibrium-specic choice
probabilities cannot be identied, the utility function and the distribution of private com-
ponents cannot be identied either (or else one could obtain the equilibrium specic choice
probabilities and use those to obtain the mixing distribution from the data).





6= 0 is likely to be satised. With two players,
for example, this determinant equals
1   1(x)2(x)f1jX(u1(x) + 1(x)p2(x))f2jX(u2(x) + 2(x)p1(x)):
Also when there are two players, the bound on the number of equilibria implies that, without
further assumptions, the existence of more than one equilibrium precludes identication.
41Table 1: Finite Sample Performance: Tests for Multiple Equilibria
(Target probability for FWE:  = 0:10)
B = 1000 B = 2000
G  RP1 RP2 RP3 RP1 RP2 RP3
1000 0:50 0:101 0:101 0:095 0:112 0:109 0:111
0:25 0:093 0:094 0:085 0:094 0:096 0:089
0:10 0:107 0:107 0:102 0:114 0:119 0:112
3000 0:50 0:108 0:109 0:105 0:087 0:089 0:083
0:25 0:096 0:097 0:094 0:102 0:105 0:103
0:10 0:093 0:090 0:092 0:111 0:107 0:108
NOTE: Design 1: Number of simulations S = 1000. G is the sample
size.  species the probability that the rst equilibrium in Example
1 is chosen. RP1, 2 and 3 are rejection frequencies of the true null
following three tests respectively: (1) the non-studentized test with
^ ck from parametric simulations; (2) the non-studentized test with ^ ck
computed via bootstrap; and (3) the studentized test with ^ dk
computed via bootstrap.
Table 2: Finite Sample Performance: Test of Signs of Interaction Eects
Brackets include [q+;q ].
G  i = 1 i = 2 i = 3
1000 0:50 [0.036, 0.076] [0.000,1.000] [0.000,1.000]
0:25 [0.035, 0.072] [0.000,1.000] [0.000,1.000]
0:10 [0.040, 0.072] [0.000,1.000] [0.000,1.000]
3000 0:50 [0.054, 0.067] [0.000,1.000] [0.000,1.000]
0:25 [0.048, 0.048] [0.000,1.000] [0.000,1.000]
0:10 [0.049, 0.053] [0.000,1.000] [0.000,1.000]
NOTE: Design 1: S is 1000. G is the sample size.  is the rst
equilibrium selection probability. q+ is the frequency of rejection of
H0 in favor of H+. q  is the frequency of rejection of H0 in favor
of H .
42Table 3: Propensity Scores in Bayesian Nash Equilibria
(p1;p2;p3 in brackets)
x1 x2 x3  = 0:8  = 0:9  = 1
 1  1=2  1 [0:3233;0:5603;0:3233] [0:3060;0:5561;0:3060] [0:2895;0:5526;0:2895]
 1  1=2 3 [0:2523;0:5288;0:7098] [0:2223;0:5196;0:7144] [0:1927;0:5111;0:7183]
 1 3=2  1 [0:2998;0:7012;0:2998] [0:2790;0:7033;0:2790] [0:2590;0:7048;0:2590]
 1 3=2 3 [0:2101;0:7262;0:7231] [0:1710;0:7323;0:7300] [0:1316;0:7376;0:7360]
2  1=2  1 [0:7124;0:5286;0:2518] [0:7167;0:5194;0:2219] [0:7203;0:5109;0:1922]
2  1=2 3 [0:7479;0:4754;0:7477] [0:7593;0:4541;0:7599] [0:7704;0:4322;0:7717]
2 3=2  1 [0:7249;0:7263;0:2098] [0:7313;0:7324;0:1707] [0:7369;0:7376;0:1314]
2 3=2 3 [0:7738;0:7724;0:7754] [0:7927;0:7903;0:7955] [0:8126;0:8090;0:8166]
Table 4: Finite Sample Performance: Test of Signs of Interaction Eects
(No. of simulations: S = 1000. Brackets include [q+;q ].)
G = 5000 G = 10000
 = 0:8  = 0:9  = 1:0  = 0:8  = 0:9  = 1:0
X1 =  1 [0:000;0:469] [0:001;0:628] [0:000;0:854] [0:000;0:717] [0:000;0:890] [0:000;0:986]
X2 =  1=2 [0:003;0:359] [0:000;0:520] [0:000;0:714] [0:000;0:577] [0:000;0:790] [0:000;0:925]
X3 =  1 [0:000;0:483] [0:000;0:643] [0:000;0:834] [0:000;0:702] [0:000;0:888] [0:000;0:986]
X1 = 2 [0:323;0:004] [0:459;0:000] [0:667;0:000] [0:484;0:000] [0:736;0:000] [0:910;0:000]
X2 = 3=2 [0:400;0:000] [0:617;0:000] [0:817;0:000] [0:665;0:000] [0:867;0:000] [0:979;0:000]
X3 = 3 [0:300;0:004] [0:496;0:000] [0:735;0:000] [0:545;0:000] [0:764;0:000] [0:930;0:000]
NOTE: q+ is the frequency of rejection of H0 in favor of H+. q  is the frequency of rejection of H0 in favor of H .
43Table 5: Summary Statistics (HRS Cohort)
Variable Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
(1992) (1994) (1996) (1998)
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Joint Ret 0.055 4,754 0.102 4,260 0.139 4,057 0.165 3,834
Only Husband Ret 0.150 4,754 0.166 4,260 0.193 4,057 0.229 3,834
Only Wife Ret 0.064 4,754 0.086 4,260 0.096 4,057 0.097 3,834
Variable Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8
(2000) (2002) (2004) (2006)
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Joint Ret 0.202 3,589 0.256 3,405 0.325 3,185 0.394 2,920
Only Husband Ret 0.259 3,589 0.265 3,405 0.265 3,185 0.259 2,920
Only Wife Ret 0.102 3,589 0.113 3,405 0.096 3,185 0.132 2,920
NOTE: The sample includes couples from the Health and Retirement Study with at least one
partner in the HRS cohort, i.e., born between 1931 and 1941.






NOTE: Available for Wave 1 only.
44Table 7: Test of Multiplicity and Interaction Signs
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
Age Dif (Yrs) Test Stat N Test Stat N Test Stat N Test Stat N
< -5 1.78 155 0.96 145 1.22 137 0.84 123
-5 to -2 1.77 175 2.13 160 1.58 146 2.40 137
-2 to 2 4.38 1,536 6.30 1,407 5.80 1,316 4.94 1,245
2 to 5 4.35 1,305 5.51 1,196 5.05 1,114 4.18 1,038
> 5 5.33 1,870 4.83 1,645 5.73 1,546 5.01 1,468
Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8
Age Dif (Yrs) Test Stat N Test Stat N Test Stat N Test Stat N
< -5 1.12 117 0.65 109 0.94 103 0.79 87
-5 to -2 1.23 132 1.67 123 1.03 120 0.66 104
-2 to 2 4.83 1,167 3.91 1,105 3.43 1051 1.87 995
2 to 5 3.39 955 3.47 901 2.48 845 1.74 786
> 5 1.30 1,324 0.92 1,256 2.96 1,166 2.60 1,050
NOTE: The sample includes couples from the Health and Retirement Study with at least one partner in
the HRS Cohort, i.e., born between 1931 and 1941. Age dierence is husband's age minus wife's age.
The test statistic is G1=2(^ V^ ^ V
0
) 1=2^ 	.
45Table 8: Wave 4 (1998)
Variable N Mean
At least one with college or above 4,011 0.306
Total Household Wealth (Dollars) 4,011 378,591.2
Age (Husband) (Yrs.) 3,919 62.8
Age (Wife) (Yrs.) 3,926 58.8
Poor Health (Husband) 3,919 0.271
Poor Health (Wife) 3,926 0.240
NOTE: The sample includes couples from the Health and
Retirement Study with at least one partner in the HRS co-
hort, i.e., born between 1931 and 1941.
46Table 9: Test of Multiplicity and Interaction Signs
Poor Health (At Least One)
No Yes
Age Di Total Wealth College Test Stat N Test Stat N
Tercile
1
Yes 1.64 145 1.05 205
No 1.51 69 1.02 17
[ 2yrs.;2yrs.]
2
Yes 2.53 203 1.27 87
No 2.00 95 0.82 29
3
Yes 2.42 156 1.14 56
No 1.91 162 0.38 21
1
Yes 2.07 149 1.75 209
No 1.67 35 -0.08 20
(2yrs.;5yrs]
2
Yes 1.40 152 1.52 96
No 0.98 74 0.74 14
3
Yes 1.13 106 1.34 46
No 1.23 115 0.8 22
1
Yes 2.6 223 1.22 337
No 1.74 75 0.83 59
> 5yrs.
2
Yes 2.55 156 0.88 98
No 2.28 113 0.62 39
3
Yes 1.64 113 0.74 55
No 3.10 159 1.33 41
NOTE: The sample includes couples from the Health and Retirement Study with at least one
partner in the HRS cohort, i.e. born between 1931 and 1941. Age dierence is husband's
age minus wife's age. Tercile 1 is the one with highest total wealth. The test statistic is
G1=2(^ V^ ^ V
0
) 1=2^ 	.
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